Timocracy: The Logic of Popular Dictatorship

• In Event: Authoritarian Government & Democratic Backsliding

Abstract

Authoritarianism is often normatively defined by the lack of popular consent. Yet in practice some dictators appear to enjoy wide public support at least some of the time. Although we dispute neither that the notion of mass support for authoritarianism presents a number of concerns including those of conceptual equivalence and measurement validity, nor the rationalist assumption that the dictators primarily seek to maintain and enhance their power, we seek to demonstrate in this paper that the phenomenon of “popular dictatorship” is both theoretically possible and empirically observable. We posit that although repression is important, and is typically a strategy of last resort, under authoritarianism, this fact does not in itself preclude the possibility of popular support for the regime much of the time. At the same time, we critique the assumption underlying most rationalist accounts that dictators provide benefits to as narrow a winning coalition of supporters as possible. Some dictatorships evidently provide public goods much more extensively, and not merely out of miscalculation. Drawing from historical and contemporary illustrations of non-democratic politics, we build a theory of a popular dictatorship, or “timocracy”. “Timocracy”, characterized as a regime based on low repression and high popular loyalty, was a term coined by Ronald Wintrobe, who himself followed the language and logic of Plato.

The paper includes a comprehensive survey and develops a novel theory tested through the mixture of qualitative and quantitative evidence. Its contribution is threefold. First, we provide evidence that a not insignificant number of dictators are in fact popular. Obtaining an accurate picture of popular opinion under authoritarianism is an enormous challenge. Some plausible survey data exists for recent figures such as Vladimir Putin. For others, however, from Octavian Augustus to Napoleon III of France to Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, other qualitative and quantitative data sources, including contemporaneous letters and petitions, can be relied on for behavioral indicators. Surveying a broad body of both canonical and recent research, we show that because individual dictators have complex motivations and pursue different strategies of maintaining power at different times, it is not oxymoronic to regard certain dictatorships as “popular”, at least some of the time. For evidence, alongside qualitative data sources, we also measure discretionary spending on public goods that is driven by reasons unrelated to current macroeconomic conditions, and that can be attributed to incumbent leaders. Second, in addition to the “what” question, we also address why dictators turn to popular policies. Dictators are driven by a mixture of strategic goals, such especially that of reducing the costs of repression and strengthening their position within their ruling coalition, as well as non-strategic goals, such as programmatic policies and personal preferences rooted in individual background and experiences. Third, we also turn to the “how” question, and elucidate the different pathways that dictators rely on to build popularity including welfare provision, fighting corruption and crime, and the issue of national interests. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of “timocracy” for the democratic theory, as well as for current theories of authoritarian rule.

Authors

• Alexander Baturo, Dublin City University

• Paul D. Kenny, Australian Catholic University