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Agnosticism on Racial Integration: Liberal or Libertarian?

Fri, October 1, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

In recent years, as movements for racial justice have gained renewed national prominence, political theorists have revisited debates over black-white racial integration in the United States. Among the most prominent contributions to this literature has been Andrew Valls’s (2002, 2010, 2018) attempt to develop a comprehensive liberal approach to racial justice. With respect to the longstanding question of integration versus separation, Valls’s distinctive intervention is to argue that a liberal perspective is chiefly concerned not with end-state patterns of racial mixing or racial clustering, but rather the achievement of fair conditions under which individuals can choose where to live, attend school, etc. in the first place. On this view, once fair choice conditions are achieved, the appropriate stance toward patterns of racial-spatial distribution is one of agnosticism. This agnosticism departs from a bedrock premise of integrationist theory, as well as from some strands of black nationalist thought. According to Valls, it is the best way to secure the liberty and equality of black Americans, and to promote racial justice in a manner consistent with liberal and democratic ideals.

This paper develops a partly sympathetic critique that complicates the liberal approach and calls into question the coherence of its agnosticism—with significant consequences for how theorists of racial justice approach integration’s individual and collective dimensions. While acknowledging the important concerns that Valls raises about integration, it contends that the seeming clarity of the liberal framework rests on an important oversimplification and a key unwarranted assumption. Specifically, the paper first argues that the theory’s understanding of coercive pressure is predominantly, and implausibly, materialistic; by overlooking other relevant dimensions of coercion, it generates an overly permissive interpretation of what counts as an uncoerced choice. Second, the paper contends that the account’s agnosticism toward the outcomes of fair choice rests on an implicit assumption that voluntarily-chosen patterns of spatial clustering will not seriously undermine the liberal and civic ideals that the theory otherwise endorses.

On the basis of these two points, the paper suggests modifications that would correct for these shortcomings of the liberal approach, but that would also qualify its distinctive agnosticism toward patterns of racial clustering. In order to provide principled criteria for distinguishing benign from problematic forms of clustering while also respecting the liberty of citizens, it suggests maintaining a nationalized conception of citizenship of the sort envisioned by proponents of integration such as Elizabeth Anderson.

Although Anderson’s ideal of national citizenship is viewed with skepticism by many contemporary critics of integration (including Valls), the paper argues that it provides an important check on an approach that otherwise risks lapsing from liberalism into libertarianism. As the final section of the paper argues, proponents of a choice-centric approach could reject attempts to qualify its agnosticism. However, in light of the undemocratic and/or illiberal consequences that this rejection might entail, such a response would generate a theory of racial justice that arguably substitutes a worthwhile ideal of liberal-democratic freedom with a problematic valorization of individual choice. The possibility of a libertarian reading is latent in some formulations of Valls’s approach, depending on how formally it interprets fair conditions of choice and how unwilling it is to critique the results of formally fair and voluntary choices.

The paper concludes that while a liberal approach to racial integration has desirable elements, it should be qualified and modified in order to accommodate other valuable priorities that are also part of a broader theory of racial justice appropriate for the contemporary United States. While the paper argues that its proposed modifications are both preferable on their own terms and more consistent with other elements of Valls’s approach, it allows that a libertarian interpretation is also an available alternative.

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