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Existing research on the relationship between corruption and voting expects that the electoral mobilization of corruption, that is during election campaigns, is an electorally viable strategy. However, there is little systematic evidence that tests whether making corruption a central campaign issue actually increases vote share. I test competing hypotheses about the electoral returns to anti-corruption platforms to estimate voter support for candidates campaigning on anti-corruption policy promises. Using original conjoint experimental data from India and the UK, I find that candidates are less likely to be selected when campaigning to fight corruption as opposed to other issues, even if anti-corruption platforms are framed as highly effective and non-costly for voters. These findings illuminate the role of corruption in election campaigns and have important implications for corruption and voting more broadly.