Rightwing Populism and Affective Polarization in European Parliaments

• In Event: Speeches and Position Taking in a Comparative Perspective

Abstract

With unprecedented support for anti-globalization parties and candidates across the Western world, many scholars have raised alarm about the effect on the polarization of party systems and its consequences, such as polarization in the US Congress. At the mass level, US studies have shown that partisan divisions are increasingly social identity based, especially surrounding ‘authoritarian values’ (MacWilliams 2016), seen in attitudes on immigrants, race, security, and nationalism. This implies an increased ‘affective polarization’ in the electorate, characterized by treating members of the other party as ‘a disliked out-group’ (Iyengar et al. 2012; Mason 2018).

The increasing salience of authoritarian values in party politics in the US mirrors the rise of right-wing populism in Europe (see, e.g. Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Mudde 2007). The growth of populist parties capitalizing on reactions to globalization, as well as traditional parties changing pre-emptively and in response to such parties, has the potential to polarize the political systems of Europe by enhancing the role of social identity as a basis for political support. Previous research has shown that the mainstream parties’ responses towards right-wing populist parties have been variable in different European countries, ranging from ignorance, isolation, co-optation to collaboration, but often they have, at least initially, been treated as “pariahs”, with dubious democratic standards that diverge from the general current consensus (e.g. Downs 2001). As indicated by the research by De Lange (2012), whether a populist right-wing party is treated as a pariah can change over time, since mainstream right parties have turned to right-wing populist parties as partners when these parties increased in electoral support.

This paper aims to contribute to the literature by measuring affective polarization at the elite-level, as indicated by mainstream party responses to rightwing populist parties in parliament. We suggest that when mainstream parties clearly distance themselves from rightwing populist parties, affective polarization between parties is likely to be high. Empirically, we aim to measure the degree of affective polarization at the elite-level in parliamentary systems by focusing on legislative debates, and the language used by mainstream political parties toward rightwing populist parties and candidates.

To evaluate these claims, we use legislative speech data from four European countries with different experiences with rightwing populist parties, and with varying responses among the mainstream parties to these parties (Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden). We analyze speech using a dictionary-based technique (LIWC), which captures emotional content and the affective qualities of text. By identifying the contexts in which MPs refer to other parties, we assess the style of speech used and how this varies by member with regard to the content of speech. Specifically, we focus on the manner in which the rightwing populist parties are referenced in parliamentary debates, as well as how the rightwing populist party relates to other parties, particularly to the mainstream right.

Authors

• Hanna Back, Lund University

• Royce A. Carroll, University of Essex

• Esther Mary L. Calvo, Lund University