Accidental Cumulation in Studies of Clientelism, Corruption, and Governance

• In Event: The Problem of Knowledge Cumulation

Abstract

Political science and political economy research in less developed countries is currently centered on problems of governance, with a focus on clientelism and corruption. With the exception of the Metaketa work on information campaigns, research in this area has proceeded without explicit coordination. Yet some findings seem to have cumulated, as studies build on one another. Among these are that clientelism is common, that politicians who participate in clientelism are trapped in an inefficient equilibrium, that clientelism occurs in systematically different ways throughout the electoral cycle, and that voters are poorly equipped to overcome clientelism on their own. In this essay, I reflect on specific characteristics of this research program that facilitate research cumulation, as distinct from research in other areas of comparative politics. I argue that research on clientelism and corruption occurs within broader shifts favoring increased quantification, conceptual and analytical precision, and research transparency in political science. These shifts make spontaneous cumulation of knowledge more likely because they facilitate informal borrowing and replication among scholars.

Authors

• Miriam A. Golden, European University Institute

• Stephane Wolton, London School of Economics