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This paper examines whether the judicialization of politics is an outcome of an established legal doctrine, a collective effort of courts, or specific judges' desired policy purposes. The judicialization of politics is a process in which the judiciary becomes a veto player with enhanced agenda-setting powers. One of the key features of the judicialization of politics is judicial activism manifested in judges striking down the executive branch's decisions. We examine this topic using the case of Israel's High Court of Justice (IHCJ), which serves as an instance of the Israeli Supreme Court that reviews petitions regarding grievances citizens have against the government's decision and activities. We use an existing database that examines all the IHCJ's decisions from November 1995 until December 2018, all coded in accordance with the political ideologies associated with the petitions submitted to the IHCJ. We then used individual judges' decisions on these petitions to scale them on a left-right political ideology scale. We seek to explore the consistency of judicial activism (i.e., accepting the petition and ruling against the executive), using three parameters: the legal field the petition relates to, changing court compositions (natural courts), and judges' political ideologies. We also test the effect on judicial activism of various other control variables: government compositions, ruling parties' ideological positions and public opinion perceptions of the judiciary. We show that judicial activism's primary effect is the interaction between a judges' ideological position and the natural-court she resides in. Thus, the judicialization of politics is an outcome of a compromise between particular judges' preferences and the scope of preferences yielded by the aggregation of the judges' preferences as long as they reside jointly on the court.