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Co-Operation Above and Conflict Below: Interactions in Polycentric Systems

Thu, September 30, 6:00 to 7:30am PDT (6:00 to 7:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Lake Victoria’s fisheries in Tanzania depicts features of polycentricity after government reforms of devolution and the introduction of co-management in the fisheries sector but continues to be plagued by illegal and overfishing. Polycentric systems have multiple, autonomous decision centers involved in some form of coordination with each other with overlapping authority. Although these centers are formally independent of each other, they interact with each other through a system of overarching rules. Scholars suggest that these interactions can be grouped into cooperation, conflict and conflict-resolution, and competition. Previous studies have focused on case studies of how authority, information, and resources shape either cooperation, or conflict and conflict-resolution, or competition in varying levels of action (i.e., constitutional choice, collective choice, and operational choice). However, it is likely that decision centers may not engage only in cooperation, or conflict and conflict-resolution, or competition with each other, but may engage in different kinds of interactions simultaneously depending on the policy issues. Thus, this research examines how authority, resources, and information shape government interactions in Lake Victoria’s polycentric fisheries in Tanzania using the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework through qualitative case study methods. Results indicate that authority, information, and resources shape cooperation among higher (central governments) and lower-levels (county governments and fisherfolks) at the constitutional level. However, at the collective and operational levels, non-cooperation and conflict between higher and lower-level decision centers dominate because of ambiguous authority, and a lack of information and resources. Overall, these interactions prevent the meaningful involvement of lower-level decision centers in fisheries management, while widening the reach of higher levels into different aspects of fisheries management such as monitoring, enforcement, and surveillance. As the downward reach of higher-level authorities increases, top-down measures of shock and awe are employed to coerce compliance of lower-level decision centers such as fisherfolks for reducing illegal and overfishing.

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