Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Even when citizens value free and fair elections, their support for democratic accountability mechanisms is weak and contingent. In particular, citizens might be willing to trade off checks and balances for party allegiances and policy performance. In this study we provide new observational and experimental evidence for the effects of partisanship and government economic performance. Using survey data from 26 European countries, we show that among voters with strong party allegiances support for checks and balances is significantly higher for those who voted for opposition parties and who are dissatisfied with the economy. Using a vignette experiment run on a representative sample in Ukraine, we show that people have significantly lower levels of government support and trust and significantly lower chance to find reforms that erode judicial independence justified and acceptable, when they have been told that these reforms are implemented by a government they opposed at the elections.