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This paper tests the mechanisms affecting incumbency advantage and democratic alternation - a fundamental aspect of healthy democracies. While the existing literature has focused mostly on the behavior of voters and individual candidates in the United States and other bipartisan systems, we consider a multi-party setting and investigate the effect of parties’ strategies on incumbency advantage. We study this question in the context of France, where local and national representatives are elected in two-round plurality rule elections, and the first round often features more than five or even ten candidates. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that winning an election increases a candidate’s (resp. party and political orientation) chances of winning the next election by 25 percentage points (resp. 13 and 12 percentage points). These effects are driven both by an increased likelihood of winning conditional on running again, and by an increased likelihood of running again while other parties of the same orientation are, instead, less likely to enter the race. The latter mechanism reveals party-level coordination and indicates that such coordination is more effective on the winning side. To understand why winners are more able than losers to reach dropout agreements with parties of the same orientation, we test whether they hold a known advantage – thus discouraging close opponents from campaigning against them. We consider three different possible advantages. First, using data on campaign expenditures, we do not find any evidence that incumbents are able to raise more money than challengers. Second, a textual analysis of the content of individual manifestos issued by parliamentary candidates reveals that incumbents tend to set the agenda and use more original communication. Third, incumbents may become focal points on their side of the political spectrum as a result of winning the previous election. One would then expect qualifying for the runoff to also play that role. Exploiting the French two-round system and using another regression discontinuity design, we find that qualifying to the runoff increases a candidate’s likelihood to run again and to win the next election by 1.3 percentage points. However, it also increases the number of candidates from the same orientation present in the race, suggesting that gaining visibility through a runoff qualification does increase a candidate’s chances to win in the future, but not through party agreements.