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Coercion in Cyberspace: A Model of Extortion via Encryption

Tue, September 28, 10:00 to 11:30am PDT (10:00 to 11:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

While cyber means are increasingly incorporated in military operations in practice, theoretical literature on how cyber means may or may not be used to achieve strategic ends remains underdeveloped. In particular, cyber operations often include diverse design features that should be delineated and discussed separately, rather than treating them as monolithic. Contrary to the existing argument that cyber means have little coercive potential, I argue that such assessments may be premature considering the logic behind the success of ransomware, which extorts victims by using encryption to deny access to critical systems or information. The coercive logic of ransomware, unlike wiper malware, does not come from the power to hurt held in reserve but from the application of costs up front followed by a promise. At the same time, ransomware contains features such as backups and reversibility that depart from existing models of torture, kidnapping, blackmail, or fait accompli tactics. I present a formal model of ransomware showing that under complete information, it is always optimal for the victim to acquiesce without delay. The model also explains how two distinguishing features of costless and automatic application of flow costs and reversibility enhance the coercive utility of ransomware compared to similarly structured coercive threats. Contrary to conventional wisdom, comparative statics show that investing in network defense does not decrease the ransom amount demanded, through ransomware can be made unprofitable by making backup technology or alternative recovery effort cheaper. The model also implies that victims may not adhere to government advisory to never pay ransom, and that current insurance practices that cover ransom payments encourage further attacks. While imperfect information and commitment problems in repeated games are expected to qualify model predictions, baseline expectations about the coercive power of ransomware imply that future coercive cyber operations are likely to leverage the power to encrypt rather than the power to destroy.

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