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How does biased political recruitment – and the subsequent legislation of gender quotas – affect the quality of women’s performance as representatives in Parliament?
I draw on insights from the literature on political agency to distinguish between the effects of selection and sanction. First, if recruitment in the absence of quotas implies higher requirements for women, then selected women are of higher quality. Second, if quotas effectively levels the playground, new women enter office. However, parties are less certain about the quality of these women and react by increasing accountability.
Drawing on a differences-in-differences approach, I investigate representation in the European Parliament (1999-2014) before and after the legislation of quotas in several member states. Absent quotas, I find that biased selection leads to female representatives who pursue longer careers and perform better at equal levels of effort. When quotas are legislated, parties emphasize women’s service records during reselection. Women are thus incentivized to put in more effort.