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Contemporary political discourse is saturated with concern over partisan polarization. Many worry that the United States can ill-sustain the rising levels of division that have been documented in a vast and sophisticated social-science literature (e.g., Campbell 2016; Lelkes 2016; Iyengar et al. 2019). Yet despite the attention lavished by empirical scholars, there has been very little normative analysis of the implications of polarization for the character of the political community, or democratic cohesion. Theorists of democratic cohesion have spent significant energy attending to the challenges of social pluralism, but they have done so at the expense of political pluralism of the kind partisanship instantiates. The two leading accounts – which premise cohesion on either shared identity (liberal nationalism) or shared principles (constitutional patriotism) – have significantly advanced our understanding of the citizen bond in light of social diversity and historical marginalization. But the literature largely frames the questions of cohesion in such an abstract way that partisanship falls out of the picture. Nor has any of the recent normative defenses of partisanship considered the implications of their arguments for broader theories of citizenship and cohesion.
An urgent question, then, is whether there is a conception of democratic cohesion available to us that takes seriously the normative benefits of partisanship (Rosenblum 2008; Muirhead 2014; White and Ypi 2016) while articulating principled limits to its most divisive forms. We need a sustained account of a normative yet reasonably-realistic positive ideal of cohesion against which we can evaluate contemporary trends of polarization.
This paper offers one such account. I argue for a conception of democratic cohesion premised on shared action which accounts for the crucial role of partisan participation – but only partisanship of a certain kind. Shared-action views, while not as prominent as shared-identity or shared-principal views, have recently received new interest (Sangiovanni 2015; Sevinc 2019). These accounts emphasize interdependent, collaborative activity as the most plausible and normatively-attractive source of cohesion in contemporary pluralistic societies. The paper develops a distinctively democratic version of this argument, in which partisan participation plays a key role, and then uses this account of participative cohesion to justify normative constraints on partisanship.
The first section of the paper outlines the shared-action view of cohesion. Drawing on early social theory of industrializing society (Durkheim 1893), this view holds that mutual recognition of joint contribution to a common project underpins a valuable form of community. This view has some important advantages over other leading models of cohesion; I especially highlight the value of its recognition of the dynamic character of cohesion. There remain, however, some limitations to this account stemming from a tendency to predicate cohesion specifically on shared economic activity (Nussbaum 2007).
In part to remedy this, section two develops a specifically democratic conception of the shared-action account. I show how democratic governance shares the relevant features of economic production that generates interdependent contribution, because the full realization of collective self-government depends on the same kind of interdependence and dynamic participation. I pay special attention to the role of partisanship in realizing this participative vision, extending recent work on "systemic" accounts of deliberation (Mansbridge et al. 2012).
Finally, in section three, I articulate the conditions that partisanship must meet in order for it to fulfill this positive vision rather than detract from it. Partisans must adhere to the rules and norms of democratic competition – so long as those are animated by a desire to promote pluralism (and prevent disenfranchisement). This allows occasional gamesmanship, if the gamesmanship is in service of increasing enfranchisement (Bagg and Tranvik 2019). The shared-action view also suggests serious consideration of novel institutional ways of encouraging interdependence, such as "integrating" opposing partisans and constructing power-sharing agreements.
The primary contributions of the paper, then, are twofold. First, it enriches citizenship debates on democratic cohesion by adding much-needed attention to political pluralism and partisanship and by defending the possibility of a neglected source of cohesion, shared action. And second, the paper advances the nascent normative literature on political parties by arguing that partisanship is compatible with a robust account of democratic cohesion, but only when it is constrained by adherence to strict rules of competition. Together, these goals contribute to the formulation of a normative yardstick for assessing today's crisis of political division.