Meritocracy and State Capacity: Evidence from Imperial China

• In Event: State Capacity Beyond Taxation

Abstract

Does meritocratic recruitment strengthen state capacity? There is a strong theoretical basis to believe that meritocratic recruitment selects competent and public-spirited officials, contributing to state capacity. However, there is also reason to question the extent to which meritocratic recruitment strengthens state capacity as the day-to-day administration may require a complex set of skills and knowledge that is not tested by merit-based exams.

I test whether meritocratic recruitment has a positive impact on state capacity by examining the highly institutionalized and merit-based bureaucratic selection in Imperial China. To do so, I compile an original dataset on prefects in Qing China. I show that prefects who entered the public administration through competitive exams didn't increase state capacity, measured by famine relief, local charities, and conflict management, compared to those who entered the bureaucracy through purchasing academic titles or inheriting academic titles. To identify causal effect, I leverage the lottery-based bureaucratic assignment system in the early Qing dynasty. However, exam officials enhanced state capacity after the quasi-random assignment was replaced by discretionary appointment, suggesting that meritocracy may work under politically strenuous circumstances. This paper contributes to the literature on state capacity and bureaucracy.

Author

• Peng Peng, Duke University