Governance and Competition in Civil Wars: Rebels' Institutional Choices

• In Event: Rebel Governance: Institutions and Behaviors

Abstract

While many rebel groups establish extensive systems of governance, others forgo the creation of such institutions entirely or provide only limited forms of governance. Why do some rebel groups create no governance institutions, while others establish some or many? I argue that rebels make their different institutional choices in response to the degree of inter-rebel competition which affects rebel groups' needs for material resources and non-material support. I examine what motivates rebels to engage in governance creation in the first place before analyzing rebels' institutional choices. I focus on a variety of governance institutions to examine rebels' institutional choices. I test my argument relying on the new Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset, leveraging cross-national data on rebels' annual governance provision. It is important to understand rebels' motivations to create governance institutions, and given that they create governance institutions, the choices rebels make for and against specific types of governance institutions as institutions have long-run effects, for example on the prospects of post-conflict democratization.

Author

• Niels H Appeldorn, Texas A&M University