The Role of Perceptions of Negative Externalities in Electoral Accountability

• In Event: Conflict Processes 3 & Political Psychology Virtual Poster Session
  In Virtual Poster Session: Political Psychology Virtual Poster Session

Abstract

Why does electoral accountability for corruption sometimes fail? Why do voters fail to punish candidates accused of corruption? The literature shows that part of the answer to these questions is related to factors such as levels of corruption, informational constrains, and partisanship. In this article I argue that voters’ evaluation of the negative externalities of corruption plays a key role in their decision to punish (or not) a candidate accused of corruption. I theorise that when it comes to corruption, voters engage in consequential moral thinking; this implies that punishment is more likely when the negative externalities of corruption are more salient. Since the causal chain linking corruption to such negative externalities is long and complex, individuals with greater capacity for abstract thought are more likely to activate mechanisms of electoral accountability. Relatedly, information that concretizes the negative externalities of corruption should close the accountability gap. To test these propositions, I designed and ran a conjoint experiment embedded in a national representative survey in Peru and analysed the results between subgroups varying on their level of capacity for abstract thinking.

Author

• Viviana Baraybar Hidalgo, University of Oxford