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The current debate on civil rights in the United States holds that racial equality requires that the law either be “color-blind” or “color-conscious.” This binary theory of formal equality, however, leaves aside an important tradition of U.S. political thought, one that argues that racial equality requires the abolition of “caste.” On this alternative legal and political theory, the key point is not whether the law explicitly considers race, but whether it creates or retrenches a system of racial caste. While elements of this alternate tradition can still be found in certain contemporary U.S. Supreme Court cases, its roots lie in the early-nineteenth-century abolitionist organizing of such figures as Angelina Grimké, William Lloyd Garrison, James McCune Smith, and Frederick Douglass. The aim of this paper is to recover and this theoretical and activist tradition in and for U.S. law and politics. Acknowledging the diverse complexity of this tradition’s myriad perspectives, this paper focuses on the thought of Douglass as a leading figure in the abolitionist movement. It traces Douglass’ conception of caste from his early-1830s encounters with caste discourse in Garrison’s newspaper, The Liberator, through Douglass’ publications in his own newspaper, The North Star, and in the orations he performed in the lead-up to the Civil War. Analyzing this primary source archive, I argue that Douglass’ theory of caste—in his terms the “spirit of caste”—describes a system of affective relationships both undergirding and produced by slavery and colonization. Douglass mobilizes this conception of caste to theorize racial subjection beyond both the formal limits of the law and the biologizing and essentializing conceptions of race that were hegemonic in the period. Further, Douglass’ caste theory helps him to envision the collective liberation of Black subjects, not only in the U.S., but also in the West Indies, and Latin America. After elaborating Douglass’ theory of caste, the second part of this paper places it in dialogue with the contemporary color-blindness/color-consciousness debate to demonstrate how a historical appreciation of U.S. caste discourse can help us think beyond the debate’s dyadic constraints. Recovering this overlooked U.S. caste discourse contributes to a history of present movements for racial justice in the U.S. and challenges us to rethink the law’s capacity to redress contemporary forms of racial subjection.