Choosing Sides and Sapping Rivals Through Proxy Warfare

• In Event: Formal Models of Alliance and Rivalry in Conflict

Abstract

Major powers rarely fight direct wars and instead engage their rivals in proxy conflicts. Often, the reward to these conflicts has less to do with the geostrategic value of the conflict theater than it does with exhorting the rival to expend and deplete its resources. What should a state do when she sees her rival providing support to one side of a conflict? I argue that a state that wishes to induce the rival to overspend has two options: she may attempt to co-opt the rival’s proxy or combat the rival’s proxy. I model this decision as a team contest between two groups with both inter- and intra-group competition. The results of the model have implications for alliance formation in multi-party conflicts and offer co-opting as a novel method of proxy warfare.

Author

• Katherine Ingram, Princeton University