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Liberal democracy is not a peaceful possession. Looking back at the 20th century, at least Europeans cannot feel confident about this government system’s stability.
It was only after the fall of the Wall that optimism prevailed for a while about the democratic constitutional state’s viability in, for example, the Arab world. The attacks of September 11, 2001, however, put a rough end to that optimism.
For some fifteen years now, the so-called third democratic wave, has turned into a democratic recession. Increasingly, this has also raised concerns about the state of democracy in Western countries.
However, the rule of law also seems to come under increasing stress. For example, Hungary and Poland appear to adhere to substantially different notions of the concept. Perhaps it would be better to speak of illiberal democracies. However, that does not make the situation any better as these are the Member States of the European Union.
How can we interpret these concerns surrounding democracy and the rule of law today? One way is by considering that the democratic form of government is a typical outgrowth of modernity. Modernity broke with the idea that objectively determinable good and evil exist.
At the political level, this is expressed in the rule that the majority decides. Even if there is consensus about a decision to be taken, this offers no guarantee that the outcome will be ‘good.’
The same applies to the rule of law pillar of modern democracy. Many people are inclined to trust it when it comes to keeping democratic decision-making on the right track.
However, take the principle of legality, which is so characteristic of the rule of law. Government action that interferes with the rights and obligations of citizens requires a legal basis. Nevertheless, these laws are decided upon by the same democratic process.
Perhaps the ‘hardest’ element when considering the desired framework for democratic decision-making is constitutional and human rights. However, in Europe, these rights tend to be interpreted ‘dynamically’ by democratic majorities and judges. That means that constitutional and human rights are also part of the positive law.
Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) has a renewed relevance because he embodies the tension between modern democracy and society’s structure before the French Revolution.
In the domain of politics, the transition from traditional to modern can be traced rather precisely. After all, the Federalist Papers (1788) can be regarded as the “Bible of modern constitutionalism.”
The latter involves principles such as the people’s sovereignty, the separation of church and state, the separation of powers, and free and equal individuals’ rights. Although we now take these for granted, they represented a fundamental break with how government and society traditionally were organized.
In his book On Democracy in America (1835-1840), Tocqueville did not advocate a return to the social order before the French Revolution. Instead, he viewed democratization as an inevitable process that had long been underway and, therefore, must have been almost willed by God himself.
At the same time, the development filled Tocqueville with concern. In particular, he pointed to the pursuit of equality that went hand in hand with democratization. That, too, was not necessarily wrong in his eyes.
Tocqueville did look for a counterforce in religion to maintain the balance with another ideal of the French Revolution, namely freedom. Religion was also capable of limiting freedom.
Since the time of Tocqueville, the quest for equality has not diminished in strength. It is central to the social liberalism that is so dominant in our time that it stamps a multitude of political movements, from the left to the right of the political spectrum.
That certainly has its good points. However, the question is justified whether equality has now come at the expense of freedom. After all, that is what liberal democracy was about in the first place.
Tocqueville included, in addition to the government, also man and society in the consideration. In this way, the relationship between religion on the one hand and freedom and equality on the other can still be studied most fruitfully today.
In the proposed paper, I will apply precisely such a broad, cultural approach to the challenges with which modern democracy arguably finds itself confronted.
Like Tocqueville himself, I will not advocate a return to the medieval symbiosis between church and state. On the other hand, this does not necessarily lead to secularism that reduces religion to a private matter.
Instead, a Tocquevillian perspective raises the question of whether and how religion can continue to contribute to the vitality of liberal democracy in the West in general and Europe in particular.