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Parchment Barriers and the State of Judicial Independence in Hungary

Sat, October 2, 8:00 to 9:30am PDT (8:00 to 9:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Judicial independence has been a salient and important issue in democratic transitions. Actions to encroach on this independence are taken very seriously, evidenced by the Article 7 procedures against Hungary and Poland. A political consensus seems to exist that legal changes to the constitutional courts should be condemned as threats to judicial independence. In empirical works on the subject, however, a very different consensus exists, finding no relationship between ‘parchment barriers’, or de jure independence, and de-facto judicial independence. The gap between the political consensus and the scholarly consensus is an important one, because resolving it should dictate policy responses to the very real problem of captured courts. This begs an interesting question– how have legal changes to the regulation and makeup of judiciaries affected actual judicial outcomes in these countries? This paper first inspects and reconsiders the key characteristics of de jure judicial independence, showcasing the need for more conceptual clarity between the relevant legal or constitutional provisions and the actual changes to the incentive structure which judges, governments, and citizens operate within. It then analyzes constitutional court cases in Hungary and finds tentative evidence that the legal changes to the constitutional court are related to a decrease in the likelihood of a case being decided against the preference of the ruling government. Moreover, this paper identifies and analyzes two potential mechanisms of change – altered judicial behavior and structural constraints – which would theoretically affect de facto judicial independence. The distinction between these two mechanisms has implications for the efficacy of different policy responses.

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