How Pressures to Coordinate Can Foster Systemic Discrimination

• In Event: Enhancing Pluralism by Understanding Systemic Biases

Abstract

This paper builds a game theoretic model which demonstrates the ease with which systemic discrimination arises in populations with two groups, such as two ethnic groups, or males and females. The model enables correlating the costs of coordination resting on the subjugated group with whether the majority or the minority is advantaged in the interactions. It shows that when the costs of coordination are relatively low on average, then it is more likely that the majority will dominate, while if the costs of coordination are relatively high, then it is more likely that the minority will dominate. This model paves the way for illuminating the following points which are relevant to providing remedies for discriminatory practices. First, if discrimination arises easily in populations with binary-identity markers, then we should expect it to be prevalent. Second, expecting discriminatory practices to be the norm rather than the exception invites extensive interventions to provide means to achieve social coordination without placing the burdens on the individuals from one group. Third, if costs (and benefits) are correlated to the relative proportions of the two groups, then we may gain insight into how pernicious the discrimination is, and the extent of the incentives and alternative means necessary to lessen biased practices

Author

• Sonja M. Amadae, University of Helsinki