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A Political Ethic of the Complicit

Fri, October 1, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

There is a risk that agent-centred accounts of oppression become trapped in an oppressor/oppressed binary that effaces more nuanced understandings of responsibility. Structural accounts of oppression, on the other hand, risk losing the agent entirely and with it the potential to be action-guiding for individuals. Attempts have been made to avoid these traps. In ethical philosophy, there is extensive discussion of the duties of bystanders, for instance. More recently, a burgeoning discourse of allyship seeks to guide those who wish to aide the oppressed. In this paper, I work from an understanding of structural injustice as positioning agents relative to one another and to the basic structure of society. I argue that, in democratic societies, the structural injustice predominantly positions citizens as complicit with oppression. Democratic citizens are complicit to varying degrees, but the condition of complicity is nonetheless far more common than being oppressor, oppressed, or straightforwardly innocent. Too often, existing discourse seeks to launder this complicity. Conceptualizing people as bystanders erases any understanding of complicity, while allyship discourse involves a performative renunciation of complicity with oppression. Through the paper, I seek to develop a political ethic of the complicit. This builds on work by Tommie Shelby in developing a political ethic of the oppressed, and in particular takes as foundational the insight that structural positioning relative to oppression renders differentiated ethical frameworks appropriate to different agents.
Existing literature on the ethics of complicity is principally focused on attributions of responsibility and guilt to agents (e.g. Christopher Kutz, Gregory Mellema). The political ethic of the complicit I develop is instead intended to be action-guiding from the perspective of the complicit agent. Rather than focusing on the attribution of blame, it takes as its central problematic the acceptance of responsibility. In the first part of the paper, I argue that democratic citizens are indeed complicit in oppression generated by the structural injustice of their society. Because democratic citizens have a degree of influence or control over the structure of their society, membership in the polity thus carries a degree of complicity with societal oppression. I make the case for an understanding of “weak complicity” by which citizens accept responsibility for remediating harms which they do not consciously promote so long as they participate in the structures that reproduce those harms. Thus, contrary to guilt-centric conceptions of complicity, we can be understood to be complicit in oppression even without deliberately choosing to contribute to that oppression. However, weak complicity generates proportionately weak remedial duties. If the totality of our complicity is ordinary participation in a political system that generates oppression, then using your ordinary forms of political participation to oppose that oppression may be a sufficient response. Stronger forms of complicity will generate concomitantly stronger obligations to provide redress. Inhabitants of stolen Indigenous land, for example, might have particular duties to contribute to restitution.
In the second part of the paper, I distinguish a political ethic of complicity from discourses of allyship. Although the concept of allyship is embraced by many and can be genuinely helpful in combating oppression, it is also of limited application. A minority of citizens self-identify as “allies” to any particular oppressed group. That self-identification is then frequently contested by members of the oppressed group. Contestation often operates in two directions. First, it acts to ratchet up the requirements of allyship (think of the form: “don’t call yourself an all unless you...). Second, contestation of ally status can come to be a demand for epistemic deference. That is, those who wish to call themselves allies must be guided in their action not by their own ethical judgments, but by the judgments of the oppressed. Taken together, this makes allyship overly demanding for the majority (who simply opt out of the discourse entirely). A political ethic of complicit, on the other hand, is more clearly inclusive of the entire democratic citizenry. By highlighting complicity and responsibility independent of guilt, this approach guides everyone towards action to oppose oppression. The theorization of stronger and weaker forms of complicity also makes room for scalar degrees of responsibility and commitment, rather than leaving people to self-select as hyper-responsibilized allies or exonerated bystanders.

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