What Populists Do? Populism and Security Spending in Europe

• In Event: Authoritarianism, Populism, and Foreign Policy

Abstract

Populists mobilize against elites, protest against globalism, and employ belligerent rhetoric. As a result, academic and popular media associate populists with belligerence but also with isolationism. In this paper, we attempt to clarify the security outcomes of right wing populists’ electoral success. We theorize that right wing populists are domestically focused: they rely on ongoing mobilization against domestic rivals, various minority groups, and immigrants. They are therefore likely to increase spending on domestic security measures such as policing and border control. On the other hand, despite their nationalist rhetoric, right wing populists do not have clear foreign policy preferences and are therefore unlikely to promote significant foreign policy investment. Specifically, we argue that the more electorally successful right wing populists, the higher the spending on domestic security (policing, borders), but not on international security (military operations). To test our theory, we create an original dataset of domestic and foreign security spending of all European Union members. Examining the relationship between right wing populist vote share and security spending, our initial findings suggests that indeed the more seats populists held in parliament, the higher domestic security spending. We detected no such effect on international security spending. Our paper provides one of the first systematic examinations of populist outcomes.

Authors

• Emily Holland, United States Naval War College

• Hadas Aron, New York University