Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Why do some governments give foreign militants missiles that can destroy aircraft while giving others only bullets and AK-47s? Why do some governments deploy special operations forces to carry out joint attacks with some insurgent groups, while only giving others basic training on weapons handling? Despite the fact that governments often provide costly - and controversial - forms of support to foreign militant groups, we know little about why some groups receive
advanced weapons technology and boots on the ground while others do not. Drawing on organizational sociology and military scholarship on command and control, I argue that, when state armed forces and foreign militant groups have accountability mechanisms and chains of command, they provide each other more costly forms of support like forming joint commands, carrying out joint attacks, and providing advanced weapons systems. I unpack trends in third-party provision of support through an in-depth examination of two government-foreign militant partnerships in the recent Syrian conflicts. First, I compare the types of support that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon provided to Syrian militants through analyzing a novel, subnational dataset of the roughly 150 Syrian militant brigades that received some form of US support. Second, I compare the types of support that more than 50 foreign Shia paramilitaries provided to the Syrian Armed Forces and Russian Special Forces throughout the course of the conflict. To enrich these statistical analyses, I draw on one year of fieldwork in Jordan and 68 interviews conducted in Arabic and English with relevant government officials and Syrian militants.