Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
How does civil society respond to government repression? Theoretical and empirical work has often conflated NGOs working across a range of sectors under the broad banner of civil society. However, NGOs engage in a variety of activities, and political incumbents deploy repression strategically to encourage work compatible with their interests while discouraging work that is not. Governments want to curtail the politically costly work of advocacy NGOs, and incumbents with dubious democratic credentials have recently restricted NGOs in settings as diverse as Serbia, Uganda, and India. However, NGOs engaging in service delivery often fill gaps in government programs by providing services to under-served communities, and incumbents have fewer incentives to crack down on them.
While several studies have investigated the proliferation of NGO laws in recent decades, very little research has considered how these laws affect the operations of NGOs on the ground. This gap limits our ability to understand how the broad phenomenon of closing civic spaces affects fundamental mechanisms of democratic accountability. Using a factorial discrete choice survey experiment fielded on employees from a sample of 106 NGOs in Cambodia, we estimate the effect of common government harassment tactics on a task crucial to NGOs’ survival: obtaining funding via grant applications.
Specifically, we manipulate perceptions of variation in the extent and intensity of government harassment and observe how this variation impacts NGOs' selection of hypothetical grants. We compare the size of these effects to other salient grant attributes, including the amount of funding, the share of time spent on an organization's core activities, and the funding source. We then compare whether these effects are significantly stronger for NGOs that are focused primarily on advocacy, as our theory would suggest. Finally, we also investigate whether the effect of harassment varies by other relevant NGO characteristics, including the organization's size, professionalization, and network connections.
We find strong evidence that common harassment tactics deter NGO activity. Increasing the severity of harassment to its maximum level has a similarly sized marginal effect on the selection of a particular grant as reducing the size of the grant from $60,000 to $20,000. To put this number in perspective, the median value of all grants received in the last fiscal year for NGOs in our sample was $120,000. This means that the $40,000 penalty for harassment is equivalent to about 1/3 of the median annual income from grants. Given the modest budgets and permanent fundraising challenges of Cambodian NGOs, this represents a large impact on NGO decision-making. As expected, results are stronger for NGOs that focus on advocacy, indicating that government attempts to create disproportionate disincentives for advocacy work are effective. However, higher levels of harassment also have a deterrent effect for NGOs focused on service delivery.
To explain this deterrent effect on service delivery NGOs, we turn to evidence from text analysis and in-depth interviews. Specifically, we use word embeddings to classify responses to open-ended questions about their experiences with government officials and agencies. Results confirm that both advocacy and service delivery NGOs frequently experience harassment. Qualitative analysis of these responses and in-depth interviews with NGOs outside of our sample suggest that harassment is carried about by local government officials and law enforcement under the auspices of the country’s 2015 NGO law. Specifically, local officials often accuse service delivery NGOs pf working for opposition political parties and sometimes attempt to extract bribes in exchange for granting required work permissions.
Our findings illustrate the ability of political incumbents to shape the behavior of civil society actors. However, we find that legal changes meant to increase repression of NGOs that engage in political advocacy may encourage behavior from local officials that reduces service delivery. This provides important insight into the strategic tradeoffs governments face in applying repression and sheds light on why authoritarians and aspiring autocrats might tolerate higher levels of advocacy than otherwise expected.