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Between Allegiance and Autonomy: How Clients Manage Patrons During Peacetime

Sat, October 2, 10:00 to 11:30am PDT (10:00 to 11:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Theories of alliance politics have focused on great power behavior and thus have been relatively silent on how weak clients manage their powerful patrons. Clients must credibly signal their loyalty and commitment to patrons to avoid abandonment. In addition, clients need to showcase their autonomy to domestic constituents so that their claim to legitimacy remains unquestioned. Currently, the existing literature offers theories on why clients seek foreign patronage and enter into certain types of alignments, but does not go beyond to explain what happens next: how does a client handle the signaling dilemma once it is under the orbit of a powerful patron’s sphere of influence? Also, extant scholarship tends to analyze client behavior at militarized crisis points, leading to a selection bias in which we cannot predict how clients manage their powerful patrons on a day-to-day basis, with possible changes over time. In this paper, we identify two signaling mechanisms by which the client state manages their great power patron in peacetime. The first mechanism is through signals of allegiance, which includes the client’s ostentatious participation in the patron’s initiatives and making public statements that adhere to the patron’s security interests. The second mechanism is through signals of autonomy, which includes the client’s unilateral provocations as well as public statements that undermine the patron’s security interests. This characterization allows us to develop a more fine-grained understanding of how patron-client relationships endure and evolve, from the hitherto overlooked perspective of the client states. Taking cue from recent developments in the study of major power-protégé relations, we then offer two competing factors that explain the timing of the client’s choice of signaling mechanism: the intensity of great power rivalry in the region and the strength of the client's internal political opposition. Using the case of North Korea’s diplomacy postures vis-à-vis its de facto patron China from 1990-2020, we find that the client chooses to signal allegiance when its patron is embroiled in rivalry with another great power adversary, and autonomy when it faces heightened legitimacy challenges at home.

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