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Theories of legislatures emphasize the disproportionate influence of pivotal legislators in shaping congressional outcomes. While other scholarship identifies executive branch nominations as an important mechanism of ex ante control over the federal bureaucracy, existing research does not examine whether and how legislators vary in their capacity to influence executive branch outcomes. In this paper, we study variation in legislators’ influence over the composition of the federal bureaucracy. We introduce new data on supervisory personnel in the executive branch between 1907 and 1959 and their places of residence. Using a panel design, we study how the geographic allocation of executive branch positions varied with a representative’s membership in the majority party and on important committees, seniority in the chamber, and service in leadership positions. Our results provide new evidence about the distribution of power across members of Congress and suggest how committee and party membership and leadership positions provide influence beyond legislative outcomes.