Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
How do authoritarian regimes handle non-governmental organizations? NGOs exist to complete their missions, but can only do so when allowed by a regime. Meanwhile, autocrats benefit from NGO resources if they are not outweighed by costs that NGOs present. Despite this tension, autocracies are replete with NGOs. I employ a formal model to understand this paradox. I explore the ways NGOs vary that affect how authoritarians deal with the civil society pressures of these groups. I find that the degree to which an NGO cares about its promises when applying to work in a regime compared to its original missions and goals, affects how regimes manage the existential threats that NGOs manifest. I use an original dataset of 13,000 NGO budgets and geo-coded project locations to interrogate how regimes react to these groups.