Reelection Backfire: Political Accountability and Security Provision in Mexico

• In Event: Elections, Conflict, and Violence

Abstract

The accountability literature suggests that removing term limits fosters responsiveness. In theory, reelection creates strong incentives for incumbents to increase public good provision and the welfare of their constituents. However, recent empirical literature has shown reelection increased particularistic behavior and corruption. I argue that one reason reelection does not lead to accountability is that politicians not only respond to constituents but also to the party that shapes their careers. If the party has no incentives to be responsive to citizens, so will its party members. I test this mechanism in a party-centered system, Mexico, and leverage the staggered implementation of an electoral reform that introduced reelection for local executives from 2014 to 2022. I find reelection increases accountability only when the party is electorally weak. If the party is strong, politicians do not increase effort when up for reelection, as measured by public security underprovision, the most relevant public demand in the country given the high prevalence of drug trafficking-related violence. An important increase in violence follows since territories are left for grabs due to a vacuum of power. Why is this a rational strategy for mayors? While going local leads to higher homicides, it creates an incumbency advantage that leads to a greater likelihood for mayors to get reelected. Results suggest that under strong party systems, politicians´ behavior will be consistent with the preferences of parties. More importantly, findings show that once we factor in party incentives, reelection of local politicians may lead to public good under-provision and low political accountability.

Author

• Rafael Ch, Princeton University