Armed Non State Actors' Taxation: Coercion and Consent in the Philippines

• In Event: Rebel Governance: Institutions and Behaviors

Abstract

Modern armed rebellions have terrible consequences – they cost the international community millions of dollars in counterinsurgency interventions, trigger mass migrations of refugees fleeing violence and instability (Greenhill, 2008), impede the broader development goals in afflicted areas (Collier, 2007), and result in violence and the tragic loss of life. These rebellions, or insurgencies, are also costly to operate – for example, it is estimated that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) spent over US$300 million annually on their operations (McDermott, 2017)and the Islamic State allegedly spent over US$70 million annually (Blannin, 2017). Money, it appears, is crucial to the operations and existence of these insurgent organizations, and disrupting these finances is therefore a key counterinsurgency tactic (Kilcullen, 2016). Most insurgent organizations raise their revenues through illicit activities (Rettberg & Ortiz-Riomalo, 2016), the looting of natural resources (Le Billion, 2006), ransom and kidnapping (Nossiter, 2012), and taxation or extortion monies (Ahmad, 2017).

This paper deals with these revenue raising activities of insurgent groups, and specifically investigates armed non-state actor (ANSA) taxation. Why do individuals choose to voluntarily contribute material support to some ANSAs, and why must they be coerced to do so in other cases?

This paper compares the taxation practices of three armed groups in the Philippines, which have demonstrated variation in terms of their ability to attract civilian financial support. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), for example, was successful in enticing citizens to live and work in MILF agriculture camps, and contribute a portion of their livelihoods, via taxation, to the war effort (Podder, 2012). The Government of the Philippines and the MILF have recently signed a peace agreement which includes an autonomous region of control for the group (Podder, 2012). Interestingly, the Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army followed similar practices to MILF, yet has been through one failed peace process with the government and has also failed to elicit widespread support from civilians (Xu, 2020). Abu Sayyaf, an Islamist separatist group in the Philippines, has struggled to gain local support for their cause and has relied instead primarily on funding from international terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) (Kalicharan, 2019). Further, the group has found little success in their political goals while continuing to inflict violence on Filipino citizens ((Kalicharan, 2019; Singh & Singh, 2019). Understanding why the MILF has been so successful in securing civilian support in contrast to a group like Abu Sayyaf remains an empirical puzzle which my research intends to explain in an effort to support peace processes and peace durability. This project will try to explain why those living in conflict affected areas voluntarily contribute to ANSAs via taxation, and why in some cases they must be coerced into doing so.

In so doing, this paper helps uncover the dynamics surrounding coercion and consent in ANSA taxation, and what these dynamics mean for both wartime institutions, like the provision of goods and services by ANSAs, as well as post-conflict outcomes, like peace and democracy.

Author

• Tanya Bandula-Irwin, University of Toronto