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This paper seeks to understand how the first branch oversaw the second branch over the past four years, as it examines congressional oversight of the executive branch during the Trump era. It draws to varying degrees on foundational work by Fenno (1962), Polsby (1968), Davidson (1969), Fiorina (1977), Arnold (1990), Rohde (1991), Zelizer (2004), Jones (2005), Mann and Ornstein (2006), Thurber (2013), and Binder and Maltzman (2013), though it is especially attentive to work by Kriner and Schickler (2016), as well as select journalistic accounts (e.g., Fallows, 2017). But it seeks to update and extend that existing scholarship, and to ascertain whether and to what extent it remains accurate and relevant in recent years. Towards that end, it undertakes a largely qualitative analysis of six basic categories of congressional oversight of the executive branch from 2017 to 2021: investigation (per regular committee oversight), impeachment (2019 and 2021), confirmation of presidential nominees, appropriations, authorizations, and budgetary decisions. Overall, its findings are equivocal, as there is evidence of consistency with longstanding congressional practices and norms in some areas, but significant change in others. The discussion concludes with brief speculation about the extent to which the changes in congressional oversight are merely sui generis products of a highly unusual presidency or deeper institutional developments that will persist into the new administration and perhaps beyond. This paper should be of interest to scholars of Congress, the presidency, and American political development, among others.