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A growing body of work catalogues the activities of regional organizations with repressive, authoritarian members. While we know more than ever about what these organizations do, how autocrats sustain collective action through regional organizations remains undertheorized. Implications of regional cooperation for autocrats also remain largely untested. I address these issues with a theory of regional integration organizations (RIOs) as mutual aid and stability schemes. RIOs rely on member contributions to increase regional stability and address threats to leaders, and they elicit contributions with a combination of inducements and sanctioning mechanisms. If they contribute to regional security initiatives, leaders are rewarded with military assistance against their own opponents. If they do not contribute, leaders are more likely to find their co-members intervening against them. Repressive leaders who face high potential risk of irregular removal--and high costs upon removal--increase contributions to regional security operations to remain entitled to assistance. In statistical analyses of new military deployment data, I find that repressive leaders facing higher coup risk are more likely to contribute security personnel to RIO co-members across 54 member states from Africa-based RIOs between 1990 and 2015. Second, I find evidence of RIO enforcement. Leaders who previously contributed personnel to co-members are more likely to receive military support from co-members in the future, and less likely to be targeted by co-members for anti-government military interventions.