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Near the end of Leviathan’s fifteenth chapter, Hobbes remarks on the infinite variety and mutability of human judgments concerning good and evil, out of which discord “arises disputes, controversies, and at last war.” So long as men are left to their own likings and dislikings, he reasons, their condition is that of “mere nature,” “a condition of war.” From this he then immediately draws a remarkable inference: “And consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good.” What could Hobbes mean, in declaring that all men agree on the goodness of peace, right after observing that their judgments of good and evil are endlessly variable, and irremediably discordant as a result? In what sense could this declaration follow from that observation? Commentators have usually thought that Hobbes validates the good of peace on the basis of some strategic, or prudential calculus, whereby individuals’ discord-inducing desires are outweighed by their overriding interest in avoiding the perils of war (whether because their desire for survival is paramount, or because safety affords greater scope to satisfy their desires, on balance). Yet although Hobbes does indeed argue along such lines in other, earlier works, he says nothing of the sort in Leviathan. It makes nonsense of his stated position on the irreducible diversity of human judgments of good and evil. I contend that this supposition is unwarranted, a needless and question-begging interpolation that comes from - and reinforces - a widespread, long-lived confusion over the status of peace in Leviathan’s overall argument; this in turn has stood in the way of a due appreciation of the theory of peace upon which the book’s moral and political doctrine is founded. Nowhere in Leviathan does Hobbes seek to validate the good of peace on the basis of human beings’ dominant wants or preferences, whether actual or hypothetical. (The tenacious impression to the contrary is partly due to a fallacious inference from the fact he posits the desire for self-preservation as the reason why people submit to sovereign authority. That is a separate issue.) Rather, Hobbes starts from the value of peace, taking it — and it alone — as the proper basis for judging “what is conformable, or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of common life.” When he says, “all men agree on this, that peace as good,” he is neither asserting, nor assuming, any universal congruence between peace and men’s natural wants or preferences. He is saying that unless they grant the goodness of peace, no agreement among them is possible. Such agreement consists in the readiness to defer to the good of peace as the standard of reasonableness, irrespective of one’s own likings of dislikings. Conversely, to refuse or otherwise fail to do this is to make oneself disagreeable, impeding and disrupting social intercourse. This line of reasoning deserves to be seen as the true crux of Hobbes’s enterprise as moral philosophy — for it is thus that he himself presents it. His larger point in the passage in question is to explain why his doctrine of the Laws of Nature merits the title of “the true, and only moral philosophy” - defining moral philosophy as the “science of what is good and evil, in the conversation, and society, of mankind.” That explanation appeals to no other fact about his doctrine than his putative success in having demonstrated that “justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature” are indeed the “way and the means of peace” — for this reason, and this reason alone, they constitute valid standards for distinguishing good and evil. This argument, I contend, can be seen as Hobbes’s explanation and justification of the procedure adopted throughout the preceding exposition of those nineteen rules that he designates Laws of Nature. To clear the space for such a reading, I show that there is no non-question-begging basis for attributing to him the intention to identify a rationally-compelling motive for compliance with the Laws of Nature, as commentators have almost invariably thought. I argue on the contrary that Hobbes has no further concern than to establish their moral validity - that is, their validity as moral rules, the proper basis for distinguishing socially acceptable conduct from that which is to be seen inimical to social relations - in a word, hostile. As peace is the good of human social intercourse, so the Laws of Nature are the constitutive rules through which peace becomes morally possible. In short, Leviathan’s exposition of the Laws of Nature is intended as a theory of peace.