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Democratic Emergency Claim-Making About Climate Change

Sun, October 3, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

In a 2014 essay, Bonnie Honig asks, “How to have democracy in an emergency?” This question is important, but it is also incomplete, because it presumes democratic agreement about what constitutes an emergency in the first place. Yet when it comes to many large-scale social issues, the situation at hand is not already (recognized as) an emergency. We should therefore ask not only “how to have democracy in an emergency?” but also “how to claim emergency democratically?”
The importance of this latter question is apparent in contemporary debates about climate change. For the past several years, activists, politicians, and intellectuals who view climate change as a serious and urgent threat have framed it explicitly as an emergency (The Climate Mobilization, n.d.). In response, critics (including those who agree that climate change poses a serious and urgent threat) have argued against framing climate change as an emergency. The aim of this paper is not to adjudicate this debate, but rather to ask what we can learn from it. What can it tell us about the importance of, challenges to, and possibilities for democratic emergency claim-making, with regard to climate change and more generally?
To answer these questions, I first elucidate four allegations made by critics of climate emergency claim-making: that climate emergency claim-making squashes discussion and deliberation (Gourevitch 2008 and 2010; Hulme 2019; Swyngedouw 2010), authorizes top-down and technocratic solutions to climate change (Markusson et al 2014), instills paralyzing fear (discussed in McQueen 2018), and—insofar as it claims that climate change is a uniquely existential threat to human communities—ignores the reality of indigenous genocide and dispossession (Whyte 2018). I argue that these allegations can all be read as assertions that climate emergency claim-making is, in various ways, undemocratic, because it elicits forms of decision-making and rule that are populist, authoritarian, technocratic, and/or exclusionary. Importantly, these allegations can’t be entirely disarmed simply by shifting emergency claim-making from a “top-down” to a “bottom-up” activity.
One might think that what matters about emergency claims is that they pick out situations that really are emergencies, not that they are democratic. Indeed, climate emergency claim-makers often explicitly invoke the importance of “climate truth” (Salamon 2019). But a closer look at the concept of emergency helps us see that, in addition to being assertions about what is true, sincere emergency claims are typically also claims about what is valuable, what affective registers are appropriate, what time-scales are morally relevant, and what human action can and should accomplish. It is in these respects that emergency claim-making can enact, or depart from, democratic norms.
I argue that while the foregoing criticisms of climate emergency claim-making have force, empirical practices of claiming that climate change is an emergency offer clues about how to resist them. For example, formal emergency declarations by cities and towns are often highly deliberative and don’t cede additional power to an executive. Far from emanating paralyzing dread, some climate marches and strikes are joyful and celebratory. Rather than asserting that climate change presents an unprecedented threat to human civilization, climate activists often analogize it to more quotidian threats, such as house fires. Taken together, these examples suggest that the contours of the concept of emergency itself offer a crucial resource for democratizing emergency claim-making about climate change: they enable climate emergency claims to function simultaneously as truth claims and political strategies, to operate in a range of affective registers, to make legible various analogies (from house fires to WWII) and to demand immediate action whilst operating within slower-paced political processes.

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