Legislator Influence in Rulemaking: The Impact of Campaign Contributions

• In Event: Politics of Rulemaking in the Administration State

Abstract

When do legislators decide to get involved in the rulemaking process? The rulemaking literature has mostly focused on understanding the role of interest groups in the notice-and-comment period. However, we know very little about legislators’ participation in the creation of rules by bureaucrats. Using data from the Environmental Protection Agency, this paper studies how legislators and interest groups participate during the notice-and-comment period. Results demonstrate that House members are more likely to comment on a proposed rule shortly after receiving donations from a corporate Political Action Committee that has an interest in the same rule. This effect is strongest for House members with lower vote share, suggesting that electorally vulnerable legislators are more likely to be responsive to their donors. In addition, the content of legislator comments is more similar to their donors' comments as opposed to those of non-donors that also comment on the same proposed rule. The results broadly indicate that there is an understudied channel through which contributions can indirectly affect policymaking.

Author

• Maria Silfa