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The survival of NGOs relies in part on their ability to navigate a complex environment comprised of state power and donor preferences. Studies have shown an inverse relationship between state strength and NGO effectiveness; that NGOs may flourish in weaker states and struggle in strong states (Lake, 2018). Through increased regulations, strong states can wield influence on NGOs who are required to meet these stipulations in order to continue to operate in the county. Donors also shape NGO behavior by dictating priorities. Studies have shown that NGOs respond by aligning their work more closely with donor preferences, competing with other NGOs for funding (Cooley and Ron, 2002), or adopting programming with quantifiable reporting metrics (Bush, 2015).
Scholarship on the relationship between NGOs, donors, and host states emphasize that NGOs trying to fulfill their mission operate under constraints placed upon them from donors on one side and host states on the other. While donors pressure NGOs to uphold their norms and expectations, host states provide a regulatory environment that often constrains the NGOs’ ability to meet donor expectations (Heiss and Kelley, 2017). In this way, states and donors simultaneously place limitations on and shape NGO behavior. Much of the research investigating this donor-NGO-state relationship assumes the donor is promoting lofty aims such as democratic norms or human rights (Bush 2015) and that the regulatory state hinders the NGOs from pursuing these goals (Teets, 2014). How do NGOs respond and how does their behavior shift when they face not just tension between the two, but opposition on both fronts: namely, a donor who opposes their mission and a strong, regulatory state?
Drawing on data from 54 interviews with sexual and reproductive health NGOs in Kenya, this paper shows that a strong, regulatory state need not be an impediment, but can provide a supported NGO landscape that allows NGOs to adhere to their missions and reject contrarian donor demands. Kenya is known for its symbiotic relationship with NGOs. In many parts of the country, NGOs are viewed as an extension of the state by providing necessary services (Brass 2016). NGOs have boosted the state’s power, helping it broadcast power to outlying areas, and increasing its legitimacy (Brass 2016). In Kenya, the state does not serve as a regulatory hinderance or impediment to functioning NGOs. It is a supportive state who is reliant upon NGOs to liaise with its citizenry. This integration of NGOs with the state provides a solid foundation and a framework from which NGOs gain security.
My research shows that NGOs in Kenya have demonstrated resiliency in the face of donor opposition through a bottom-up coordination effort both among NGOs and with alternative donors. When the US’s Global Gag Rule was reinstated in 2017, withdrawing funding from NGOs who performed or advocated for abortion, sexual and reproductive health NGOs in Kenya adapted to ensure they could continue to function without abandoning their missions to provide comprehensive sexual and reproductive health care and advocacy. Indeed, their behavior was shaped by donor demands, but in unexpected ways. Instead of aligning their work to meet the US’s new anti-choice demands or competing with other organizations, they increased their collaborative efforts with other NGOs by coordinating advocacy campaigns, educating and training peer organizations, and forming strategic partnerships and new consortia. They also incentivized coordination and established relationships with alternative donors. These findings suggest the need to rethink the power dynamics within the donor-NGO-state nexus. Namely, that a regulatory environment can produce strong NGOs, that when faced with opposition, NGOs can exert agency, and that NGO bottom-up cooperation (not competition) can exist in the face of funding scarcity.