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How do Korean evangelicals—mainly theologically conservative, Protestant Christians in South Korea (SK), but also ethnic Korean counterparts overseas--relate to outgroups that seem opposed to their religious or ethnic-national identities? Specifically, how do Korean evangelicals relate to LGBT persons (non-heterosexuals), North Koreans (loyal citizens of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), and “right-wing” Japanese who do not apologize for colonial past? We propose that: 1) competing groups of Korean evangelicals frame outgroups as either threats or as objects of Christian love and outreach; 2) proponents of particular narratives and frames (‘norm entrepreneurs’) draw on and contribute to transnational evangelical discourse; and 3) the appeal of particular narratives depend on real-life events.
We outline three groups of Korean Christians. One group (“old (Christian) right”)—mostly older generation, including former President Lee Myung-bak—consider all three outgroups to be antithetical to their religious and ethnic identities. They oppose LGBT legal rights, support sanctions against North Korea, and demand apologies/compensation from Japanese government. A second group (“new right,” “religious-rights evangelicals”) agree with the anti-LGBT and anti-North Korea views of the old right, but diverge with respect to Japan. Aligning with “new right” counterparts in US and Japan, the Korean new-right support a trilateral (US, Japan, South Korea) alliance against communism (North Korea, China) and for traditional family values. A third group (“outreach/humanitarian evangelicals”) support reconciliation with all three historic outgroups, and are especially active with faith-based organizations in North Korea, including the first private university (PUST), disabled medical center, and surfing camp.
Until 1990s, the old right dominated and defined Korean Christianity. But younger, more educated Christians partake in transnational discourse with non-Korean evangelicals and wish to transcend the narrow nationalism of the old right. As younger evangelicals become globalized, they divide between two, global networks: a new-right coalition vocally defending religious freedom against allegedly global leftist coalition (including homosexuals and communists); and more outreach-evangelicals that quietly support person-to-person engagement with all three outgroups. The growth of each network, in turn, depend on real-life events, domestic and abroad. Stories of pro-LGBT governments in Europe and North America, or of the communist Chinese government, oppressing Christians reinforce the new-right narrative; heart-warming tales of personal engagement support the humanitarian, outreach narrative.
We draw on the narratives and actions of Korean evangelical organizations in South Korea and USA, including interviews, participant-observations, survey analysis, and media content analysis.