Local-Level Incentives and Government Responsiveness in China

• In Event: Politics of Communist & Former Communist Countries Virtual Poster Session I

Abstract

A burgeoning literature argues that citizen complaints in authoritarian regimes constitute an important avenue through which citizens can demand better public goods provision, hold officials accountable, or uncover government wrongdoings. While extant research has identified several factors that determine responsiveness to these complaints, the pivotal role of local government incentives, as shaped by inter-governmental relations, has not yet received sufficient attention. This paper seeks to explain local government responsiveness to citizen demands through this lens, using China as a case study. Original data of over 14,000 citizen complaints and government responses from a Chinese prefecture demonstrates that lower level officials respond more quickly to citizen complaints when monitored by their superiors, whereas citizen complaints on unmonitored forums get slower responses. Thus, oversight by higher level officials is instrumental in increasing actual government responsiveness; citizen complaints alone are not enough to spur government action. This paper contributes to the literature on semi-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes by demonstrating how incentives of local political actors and inter-bureaucratic relations condition the effectiveness of these institutions.

Author

• Haemin Jee, Stanford University