Individual Submission Summary
Share...

Direct link:

Thinking Responsibility Politically

Sun, October 3, 8:00 to 9:30am PDT (8:00 to 9:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

A distracted motorist runs a red light, slamming into another car in the process. We can say confidently who was responsible for the resulting wreck. If a batch of spinach known to be tainted is nevertheless sent to stores, it’s clear who is responsible when people are sickened by the contaminated food. But who is responsible for global poverty? For the way racism and sexism alter the life chances of so many? For the predictable suffering that climate change will inflict? The trouble is not that these questions are fundamentally unanswerable—after all, it was not God but man who created the systems that pollute, discriminate, and exploit. But answering them requires a different approach.

Both popular and academic discussions of responsibility tend to focus on the individual contributions of particular actors, seeking a clear causal connection between an agent’s action and a specific outcome. Yet many of today’s most pressing problems cannot be properly understood—let alone solved—at the level of the individual. More often, they are the result of a great number of small and even unexceptional acts whose overall significance becomes clear only when the frame is expanded accordingly. Unlike the car accident or the tainted food, in cases of systemic injustice there is no particular individual or set of individuals whose discrete actions are unambiguously the primary cause of the harms. As a result, the standard approaches inevitably fall short, hindering efforts to organize collectively to create meaningful change.

Moving from a paradigm of isolated individuals to an explicit consideration of the broader context those individuals act within is vital when dealing with fundamentally political questions. For, as Hannah Arendt wrote, “the calamities of action all arise from the human condition of plurality, which is the condition sine qua non for that space of appearance which is the public realm.” Responding sensibly and effectively to injustices that are socially produced and systemically reinforced requires attending to the multiplicity and intersubjectivity at the heart of political life. Doing so raises all sorts of additional questions—about power, positionality, and the role of social and structural factors—that are generally precluded by more individualistic frames.

We are in the habit of looking at responsibility as either a personal ethic to be cultivated (as with the responsiveness Judith Butler advocates) or a form of liability to be restricted as far as possible (i.e., to “individual, intentional wrongdoing,” as Christopher Kutz puts it). I propose an alternative angle, one that considers the fundamental plurality of political life, and thus the inherent intersubjectivity of such political challenges. Taking a phenomenological approach, I begin by asking what responsibility is like, not as an abstract matter but with the specificity that comes from concrete, lived reality. How do we think about responsibility in the context of specific political challenges, like structural racism? What insights might these experiences provide for dealing with the sort of collective challenges that individual frames simply cannot fully address?

The resulting framework should be useful to citizens as well as scholars. Yet there are real limitations, too. As Wendy Brown’s discussion of responsibilization shows, more responsibility is not always a path to justice. And, while Iris Young has demonstrated how a broader framework that brings in social and structural factors can be very effective at conceptually linking us to distant harms, one must also consider Charles Mills’ warning that the failure to recognize such connections often reflects something more than a simple lack of knowledge. The power of this “aggressive” ignorance, deployed by those with enough standing to allow them to refuse to know, should not be underestimated. And the demonstrated ability of individualizing neoliberal logics to make responsibility into a disreputable thing is likewise significant. Yet I find that the concept is simply too important to be abandoned to those who would most abuse it.

Socially distributed harms from racism to climate change urgently require our attention and, more importantly, our collective action. Without a specifically political account of responsibility, we struggle to react sensibly. Thus, the paradox at the heart of this paper: how can we make sense of our responsibilities for structural injustices which exceed our intentional control, but which are nevertheless reproduced by and through us?

This paper considers why non-political approaches fall short in certain contexts and lays out some of the key components of an explicitly political frame. Working through real-world clashes over responsibility, it demonstrates the increased clarity such a frame provides. It also considers the motivations for resisting such framing—noting who benefits and what hard questions are avoided when an apolitical framework is put forth instead.

Author