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Economic rationality is the bedrock of neoliberal economic theory. However, and particularly when on the cusp of crises, corporate actors make decisions that seem counterintuitive if not wholly irrational. For example, why, after industry scientists discovered the link between burning fossil fuels and climate change in the 1970’s, did Exxon respond by spending decades funding climate change denial? When considering this empirical reality of unsustainability combined with that of the fundamental scarcity of fossil fuels, would not Exxon’s profit margin ultimately be better served if those billions funded alternative energy development instead?
Or why, in the years leading up to the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis, did the industry respond to increasing evidence of imminent market collapse by taking actions that further destabilized the market? Why would people whose livelihood depended on the subprime mortgage market actively undermine its existence?
This paper argues that Adam Smith offers an analysis of corporate appraisals of risk that is both illuminating and instructive. Despite his legacy as a champion of economic liberalism, Smith fundamentally disagrees with the conception of reason at its core. Reason is not, he argues, an abstract absolute, but one that is inherently temporal. What appears to a person as rational depends on the perception of future outcomes made available within a specific sociopolitical context. For example, whether or not it is rational to significantly improve rented land depends on length of one’s lease, and terms regarding its renewal.
By synthesizing key sections of Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, this paper demonstrates the centrality of temporality to Smith’s conception of rational agency, paying particular attention to how political and economic institutions shape appraisals of future risks and rewards. In his analysis of commercial society specifically, Smith identifies corporate structures that fundamentally distort ideas about the future, and which therefore incentivize short-sighted, aggressive risk-seeking behavior. He additionally identifies political structures that enable offloading the heightened liabilities of this behavior to the public. These features persist within contemporary corporations and liberal governments, making his work well-suited to examining the temporal dimension of recent economic and looming ecological crises. Smith is employed here to analyze the timescales of corporate logic, and socio-political changes that can make riskier, short-term decisions appear newly rational. It further argues that Smith understands the state as being singularly capable of counteracting this tendency of capitalism—not by intervening in the market per se, but by intervening in timescales of interaction.