Internal Security Threat Perception and WMD Proliferation Choices

• In Event: Domestic and International Reverberations of Proliferation

Abstract

How do leaders’ fears of regime change or loss of power drive choices between nuclear pursuit and other weapons proliferation options, such as the pursuit of chemical and biological weapons? Existing research (e.g., Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2014); Way and Weeks (2014)) finds that leaders pursue nuclear weapons as a guarantor against externally imposed regime change or interference by external actors in domestic politics. Yet concerns about internal threats to a leaders’ power may also drive choices over the range of available weapons proliferation options – particularly when that choice is constrained by the global nonproliferation regime and the availability of economic, scientific and technical resources. Leaders facing significant internal threats may prefer to pursue chemical or biological weapons as these weapons are generally perceived as less destructive, and therefore more credibly “useable” in response to domestic threats. On the other hand, a nuclear weapons program may offer opportunities to further centralize authority and, internal threats may make nuclear weapons a more desirable tool for the provision of external security (relative to conventional military power) – a centrally controlled means of regaining military effectiveness lost to coup-proofing measures. Using cross-national time series data on WMD pursuit and possession, I find results consistent with this theory for chemical weapons: internal as well as external security threats are associated with increased risk of weapons pursuit. However, for biological weapons, I find tentative evidence that internal security threats actually decrease the risk of pursuit.

Author

• Miriam Barnum, University of Southern California