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Obedience, Resistance, and Popular Reform in the Oath of Allegiance Debates

Sat, October 2, 8:00 to 9:30am PDT (8:00 to 9:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Many accounts of early Stuart political thought suggest that James I invoked the language of the “divine right of kings” to establish a moral obligation, derived from divine law, to obey the king in all things and cede private judgment to him. Jacobean theory denies the possibility of popular reform, even in the face of a corrupt or heretical sovereign. For this reason, many scholars suggest that divine-right theory proved an especially important tool in refuting seventeenth-century Catholic, specifically Jesuit, natural-law theories of popular political resistance as a catalyst for reform. They often note that Jacobean use of iure divino monarchy against Jesuit resistance theory reached its apex in the political controversy following the passage of the Oath of Allegiance in 1606. Conventional accounts of the debates surrounding the Oath suggest that Jesuits defended their natural-law, proto-contractarian resistance theory against Jacobean divine-right obedience. This paper argues that contrary to this conventional view, in the oath literature, Jesuits such as Francisco Suarez and Robert Bellarmine insist only on the papal deposing power, rather than on the possibility of popular resistance by the political community. Perhaps strategically motivated by their intention to shore up the papal deposing power, Jesuit responses to the Oath tend to downplay or outright reject the natural-law resistance theories for which the order had earned its notoriety in English circles. Consequently, in their responses to James, Jesuits cede much ground to divine-right theories of the obligation of obedience and the impossibility of popular resistance as a source of political reform.

Thus for Jesuits involved in this episode, true political renewal ordinarily descends from the sovereign, not the censure of the people; in extreme cases, only the pope, not the civil community, serves as the arbiter of reform. To shore up this thesis, Jesuit critiques of the Oath reaffirm that political power descends from God, not the people, and they assert a corollary, divine-law duty to obey sovereigns. In addition, in response to Jacobean accusations that Jesuit theories of political power reserve the right of the civil community to recuperate power from the king, Jesuits retract earlier suggestions of a conditional transfer of power from the people to the sovereign; thus they exclude the possibility of popular reform.

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