Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
The first-generation Frankfurt School’s early critique of technoscientific rationality, especially as exemplified by “Dialectic of Enlightenment” (Adorno and Horkheimer), remains influential in critical theory today. Their account of the imbrication of scientific reason in the logic of simultaneous progress and regression motivated a powerful analysis of the industrialized terror of the mid-twentieth century. Yet their frequent polemical identification of science and technology as such with positivism and instrumental rationality is today neither theoretically tenable nor politically emancipatory; it risks ceding the battle over the meaning of science to those who would claim, falsely, to speak in its name. In a moment that is at once “anthropocene” and “information age,” critical theory cannot rest content with inveighing against the degradations of technoscientific research turned to the domination of nature and of humanity. What is needed is a method for thinking about science and technology that would preserve the political insights of Adorno and Horkheimer without eclipsing the inescapable role of scientific research and technological innovation in the route to a post-capitalist future.
A model for such a method comes from the late work of Friedrich Engels, especially his unfinished “Dialectics of Nature” manuscripts. The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research itself facilitated the first publication of these manuscripts in the 1920s—yet their subsequent work turned away almost entirely from the perspective on natural inquiry that Engels had advanced. For Engels, it was as important to defend the value and promise of scientific research as it was to critique those who would misrepresent its implications or redirect its discoveries toward domination; in his materialism, a deep concern for the interconnections between all areas of basic scientific research and wider human life enables a non-reductionistic and anti-mechanistic way of understanding the significance of technoscientific activity to human society as a whole. Yet as scholars of Marxism from Perry Anderson to Sebastiano Timpanaro have argued, a deliberate turn away from the philosophical legacy of Engels was widely constitutive of the broader “Western Marxist” tradition of which the early Frankfurt School was exemplary. In this paper, I argue that the contemporary insufficiency of the Frankfurt critique of technoscience is the cost of this retreat from Engels’s own work in the lifelong collaboration with Marx. If critical theory is to have anything to say about the politics of contemporary science and technology, we would do well to re-read Engels alongside Adorno and Horkheimer. This paper carries out such a reading, resituating the contradictions of enlightenment within the logic of nature as a whole —not only as an exercise in intellectual history or textual interpretation, but as a starting point for the first-order analysis of the contradictions of our own time.