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This essay analyzes Isaiah Berlin’s objective pluralism, the relationship it holds to relativism and nihilism, and its claim to being uniquely able to recognize tragic loss in a way that monism cannot. Critics and admirers of Berlin alike have long debated what the specific merits of his pluralism are, particularly in comparison to its main rival, value monism. I argue that the merits of objective pluralism lie in its conception of tragic loss and that the recognition of unavoidable loss as a feature of choice between conflicting values helps to guard against self-deception and push us to own up to what we are actually doing when we make political choices. However, after considering three outstanding questions in relation to Berlin’s pluralism – the role of narrativity, the problem of social mediation, and the threat of status quo bias - I suggest that the promise of pluralism may lie not just in the perspective it offers on the limits of justification concerning choices between incompatibles, but also in its capacity for transforming our understanding of the values we hold.