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In 1950, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had only just won the Civil War, but its paramount leader Mao Zedong decided to put the nascent People’s Republic of China (PRC) into two regional wars—the First Indochina War and the Korean War—that had far-reaching impacts on the Asian geopolitics and the whole Cold War. On the Korean Peninsula, the CCP sent troops directly into combat with the US/UN forces, while in Indochina the CCP provided substantial military assistance to Vietnamese Communists and sent the military advisory group to participate in developing military plans.
This is quite puzzling given the PRC’s weak power position in the international system at the time. In fact, the CCP was still facing serious challenges at home: the newly established state needed recovery from the ruins of the successive World War II and the civil war; the Chinese Nationalist Party were still resisting in some regions; also, the CCP was trying to conquer Tibet. Geopolitical considerations alone, therefore, cannot satisfactorily explain these ambitious and risky military interventions. This was also not an exception. The CCP leaders have made similarly ambitious expansionist foreign policies since then, in which the PRC does not have a power advantage. Examples include Mao’s disastrous failure to export revolutions to the Third World in the 1960s, and Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative. This pattern raises more general theoretical questions: why and when do CCP leaders pursue expansionist foreign policies that are potentially self-undermining?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to look back to the first two places where CCP’s military interventions took place, the Korean Peninsula and Indochina. By examining the origin of CCP’s expansions, I explain how ideology shapes the international ambitions of CCP leaders, and how it misguides their grand strategy making and implementation by biasing their perceptions of PRC’s relative power positions (strong or weak) and relative power trends (rising or declining). Data informing this study include primary sources from China, former communist states (Russia, etc.), and the United States, including declassified archival documents, government publications, leaders’ memoirs, leaked materials, as well as secondary sources such as Cold War studies by historians.
Specifically, I develop two theoretical arguments: (1) trained in the “formal ideology” of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and shaped by the “informal ideology” of China’s imperial heritage, the CCP leaders believe that the international system naturally tends toward imbalances and hierarchy, in which great powers must ruthlessly pursue higher status with the end goal of hegemony. (2) I explain the making and implementation of CCP’s grand strategy with the CCP leaders’ (mis)perceptions about the changes in the global distribution of power through the lens of ideology. Specifically, when China’s relative power position rises, the CCP leaders tend to overestimate the future growth of China’s capabilities and the extent of decline of its rivals, and thus adopt an overly expansionist policy. When China’s relative power position begins to decline, ideology delays adjustments in grand strategy by preventing the CCP leaders’ clear-headed assessments of power reality. In this case, the CCP leaders failed to recognize the extent of China’s decline and could not retrench in time. More than individual psychological/cognitive factors, or bureaucratic politics/factional competition, it is the shared ideology among the CCP leaders that bias their perceptions of relative power and relative power trends.
This paper uses case studies to show that even from the earliest days of the PRC, CCP leaders have seen this country as a rising great power, thinking about its geopolitical position in terms of global politics and pursuing the status of leadership in Asia, In their eyes, world politics is highly confrontational, and the existing hegemonic powers in the international system are ready to attack or isolate the PRC in order to prevent its rise to higher status. “War made the state, and the state made war,” therefore, the CCP leaders have been guided by the view of strengthening the state, creating a highly centralized, authoritarian state apparatus to prepare for external conflicts that could come any time. Moreover, the quest for hegemony is deeply rooted in CCP leaders’ mindset since the CCP took power in 1949. It is nurtured by their ideology and reinforced by their revolutionary experience, as well as by imperial China’s idea of the “Middle Kingdom.” The Leninist party organization continues to instill the “collective memory” of the party’s revolutionary experience and its ambitions to new generations of party elites, albeit with varying degrees of acceptance.