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Historically, many philosophers and social scientists have drawn a sharp distinction between “normative” and “empirical” forms of inquiry. In recent years, however, a variety of scholars – including prominent students of democracy – have called for a “re-engagement” of these “forms” of inquiry. Here I offer a novel way of justifying such a re-engagement in democratic theory. Drawing on classical pragmatism, I argue that normative democratic theory is a form of “practical reasoning,” and so inevitably involves empirical inquiry. Hence, when we reason about what we think a democratic process ought to look like, we should avoid making a sharp distinction between “normative” and “empirical” forms of reasoning, just as we should avoid making any such distinction between “theoretical” and “practical” forms of reasoning. This account not only encourages democracy scholars to cultivate a historicist, contextualist sensibility but also provides a justification for comparative politics, comparative political theory, and their collaboration.