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How a nuclear state will implement extended deterrence to its allies has always been a lingering issue among nuclear states and their allies. Carrying out extended deterrence is more complicated than deterrence because more players are involved in the game. Particularly, if the ally oscillates between hostile and amicable relationships with the adversary, the calculation of deriving optimal extended deterrence measures becomes even harder. Most existing literature on extended deterrence focuses almost exclusively on the fixed dyad relationship of a nuclear state and its ally. Scholars have not systematically investigated the dynamic features of the relationships of nuclear states, allies, and adversaries. This study contributes to alliance and extended deterrence literature by adding variable aspects of states to capture the effects of extended deterrence. an adversary on extended deterrence. To assess the changeable effects of extended deterrence, this study focuses on the relationship of the U.S. (nuclear state), South Korea (ally), and North Korea (adversary).