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What is the value of contingency in political life? Does it strengthen or threaten political order? Is it essential or antithetical to liberty? Can it be measured, counteracted, avoided, or transformed into a product of the will? This paper suggests that by revisiting Machiavelli's concept of fortuna, we can glean new modes of understanding and approaching circumstances that we regard as extrinsic in origin and unintended in design.
My innovative reappraisal of Machiavelli’s fortuna, which I present as a function of the relationship between agency and contingency, begins with a close reading of one of the more infamous passages in Machiavelli’s Il Principe, wherein the verb urtare—often translated as ‘beat down’ or ‘kick'—is used to illustrate the ideal approach to fortuna. Tracing the usage of urtare across Machiavelli’s historical milieu as well as within his own literature, I reconsider the verb’s valence both in the context of the passage and elsewhere in Machiavelli’s writing. Against the popular critical notion that urtare, as Machiavelli uses it, is meant to evoke attitudes of antipathy toward or aims of domination over fortuna, I suggest instead that urtare, in its most holistic rendering, denotes a ‘knocking into’ or ‘colliding with’ the momentum of a contingent force. Nor, indeed, does Machiavelli present a fundamental disjunction between the virtù of the political agent and fortuna itself. Fortuna thus understood—as a contingent and dynamic force to be collided with, such that its strength is neither negated nor overcome, but augmented and channeled—guides us toward a more complete articulation of Machiavelli’s theory of politics, revealing in the process new ways of thinking the connections between individuality, plurality, and distinction.
These interventions illuminate the critical role that acts of collision play in what I introduce here as Machiavelli’s theory of involution: the perpetual process of conflict and creation that is both the genesis and the aim of political life. This theory is fundamental to the intent and the design of Machiavelli’s writing, and it manifests across his work conceptually as well as literarily. Through his idiosyncratic rhetorical devices, I suggest, Machiavelli illustrates the involution of two aspects of political experience by playing off their textual proximity. That is, whenever he juxtaposes two seemingly heterogeneous constructs—such as love and fear, renovation and decay, or virtù and fortuna—by placing them near one another in his text, Machiavelli ultimately reveals (often through a series of lexical shifts or rhetorical sleights of hand) the possibility that each of these constructs is—either by necessity or through active collision—one distinct yet mutually generative aspect of a fundamentally plural concept or idea. Political existence and experience, Machiavelli contends, preserves itself through only the continuous collision of its myriad aspects. Neither radically dialectical nor wholly providential, Machiavellian involution equips us with a new vocabulary with which to critique contemporary notions of political autonomy, dissent, liberty, and the relationship between identity and difference.