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By comparing the epistemic foundations of Rousseau’s pedagogical project and Hume’s social and moral theory, this paper constructs a Rousseauian critique of applying Hume’s epistemology to social and moral affairs, a practice commonly seen among advocates of “realist liberalism” in contemporary political theory.
Unlike previous readings, which saw Rousseau’s account of human cognition and judgment-making as either irrelevant or opposite to Hume’s, my paper argues that Rousseau’s account of sensation and empirical judgment in Books II and III of “Emile” resembles the model of causal judgment that Hume elucidated in “A Treatise of Human Nature” and “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.” I will show that despite the lack of historical evidence for Hume’s direct intellectual influence on Rousseau, the similarities between the two thinkers’ epistemology, based on textual evidence, are hard to ignore. Given that the Humean model does not require the presence and intervention of personal authority, I argue that Rousseau’s resemblance to Hume indicates that judging well without a personal authority is a genuine possibility for Rousseau and that this possibility is presented at the end of Book III of “Emile” and echoed in the novel “Emile and Sophie.” However, I also observe that Rousseau limited this possibility only to judgments concerning the empirical relations between objects and between objects and the judging agent. In other words, Rousseau’s endorsement of the Humean model is limited: while Hume’s moral theory is also built on his model of causal judgments, Rousseau refuses to apply the Humean model to the moral relations between the judging agent and other individuals.
Why is Rousseau’s endorsement of the Humean model only limited to amoral judgments concerning natural necessities of the physical world and utilities of objects to human beings, but not extended to moral relations between human beings? While multiple answers can be given, I would like to suggest that Rousseau’s limited endorsement is at least in part due to his insights into the impossibility of achieving the very foundation for making credible causal judgments in the Humean model – the natural experience or one’s unbiased repetitive observations of the utilities of the external world – in social life. Rather than relying on any idiosyncratic pessimism about social interactions and interdependence, Rousseau’s insights about this impossibility is grounded on two facts whose significance is not fully appreciated in Hume’s epistemology:
First, in social affairs, there is no natural experience of utilities unbiased by opinions, and the sources of these biases are not simply “the opinions of mankind” in general, but the opinions of “the rich and the powerful,” especially given that Hume admits that individuals have “a greater tendency” to sympathize with “the rich and the powerful.” Therefore, what we believe to be useful for us, are likely to resemble what “the rich and the powerful” believe to be useful, or what they want us to believe as our own utility.
Second, judgments biased by others’ opinions concerning natural phenomena cannot reproduce natural phenomena according to those opinions. At most, people blinded by superstitions will ignore new evidence, but their ignorance can be corrected by the force majeure of nature, which is indifferent to human wills. In contrast, in social life, biased judgments, through human actions, can produce new social reality in line with their visions, and hence prejudices and deceptions involved in them will also be duplicated and reproduced into the future. Given the unique reproductive feature of opinions in social life, simply increasing social interactions, unlike what Hume suggests, is less likely to correct the biases caused by the opinions of “the rich and the powerful” on common people’s judgments concerning their true interests; instead, it may enlarge such biases and make the unequal power relations between different social actors persistent in both public opinions and social practices.
While we may not accept Rousseau’s own solutions given in “On The Social Contract” and Books IV and V of “Emile” to the structural bias that harms individual judgments, this paper argues that Rousseau’s limited endorsement of the Humean model of causal judgments can be developed into a critique to the various forms of contemporary “realist liberalism,” which are influenced by or grounded on Hume’s epistemology. Following Hume’s emphasis on utility, realist liberals usually argue that “interest” is the most fundamental category in their vision of politics and that the aim of liberal institutions is to guarantee an equal opportunity for everyone to pursue their perceived interests despite unequal social power. By revealing the biasing influence of unequal social power on the very formation of everyone’s judgments of what their true interests are and how best to fulfill them, the Rousseasuian critique constructed in this paper challenges this prioritization of interest over power in realist liberalism.