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Defense industries are important for states security. However, despite facing similar theoretical security, economic, and prestige incentives to acquire defense industries, states industries diverge significantly. Within states that acquired their independence after 1945 some like Israel and South Korea acquired modern industries over the course of the 20th Century, while other like India and the United Arab Emirates possess moderate capacities and yet others like Sierra Leone and Bangladesh have no noteworthy defense industries. States that formed prior to 1945 also see significant variation, with diverse defense industries in the United States, Germany, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand. This raises two interrelated questions of importance for international security scholars: 1) under what conditions do states acquire defense industries and 2) what explains the variation of state defense industry acquisition? I locate the answer in state capacity and the complexity of technology when states attempt to acquire defense industries. Drawing upon a novel dataset (which designates keystone defense industry capabilities for various time periods as well as those states that possess that capability) starting in 1812, I show that state capacity such as raising taxes and possessing the administrative capacity to manage state-defense industry relationships are sufficient to acquire a basic defense industry but as technology becomes more advanced into the 20th Century and requires larger economies of scale, states require more than basic administrative capacity to create state-of-the-art defense industries. This creates more necessary conditions for defense industry acquisition, including credible threat or actualization of abandonment by the state’s main arms exporter, the evolution of developmental state bureaucracies, and long-term export market potential with respect to potential consumers and competitors.