What Causes Power Transition Conflicts?

• In Event: Conflict Processes 2 Virtual Poster Session

Abstract

Historically, there have been major conflicts between great powers competing for leadership that has profoundly altered the international structure. China’s recent economic ascent has made political scholars and leaders anxious about the potential for conflicts between the dominant US and a rising China. To enhance the prospects for preventing conflicts, political scientists seek to form generalizations about the causes of major conflicts and the conditions for peace. Two major theories, the balance of power theory and power transition theory, offer explanations about how the distribution of power among states affects the outbreak of wars. Balance of power theorists claim that the approximately equal distribution of power among nations leads to peace. By contrast, power transition theorists basically argue that power parity is more likely to cause wars Both theories focus on how the structural changes affect the outbreak of major wars at the systemic level. Traditionally, existing literature on major conflicts has tended to overlook the influence of domestic political factors and limitations of the empirical approach. Therefore, these studies are insufficient in the analysis of conflicts between the world’s superpowers. My project will fill the gap in the previous studies by proposing theoretical and empirical analyses of how domestic popular support of government leadership (domestic satisfaction) interacts with satisfaction with bilateral relations between a dominant power and a rising challenger (bilateral satisfaction), thereby affecting the likelihood of power transition conflicts between the two largest powers.

In this dissertation, I add a new dimension, the domestic level, to power transition theory, as well as to existing literature of conflicts. My extension of power transition theory concentrates on the concept of domestic satisfaction. I define domestic satisfaction as when the domestic population approves of the government’s performance and supports their incumbent leadership, and domestic dissatisfaction as public discontent with the government’s performance and the government’s leadership. Conventional theories assert that a foreign war is a means to divert widespread attention from internal issues. In contrast to the diversionary theory of war, I argue that a nation is likely to divert domestic dissatisfaction through winning a limited war. However, due to the long duration, highest cost, and uncertain consequence of power transition wars, domestic popular support of government leadership is a precondition of extracting necessary resources and mobilizing the total population to ensure victory. Therefore, I propose that power transition conflicts are more likely to occur when either a challenger or a defender achieves the necessary high degree of domestic popular satisfaction with the government’s leadership.

To test my hypotheses, I conduct a series of empirical studies to examine how domestic political factors (national or individual level), international systemic conditions (systemic or group level), and their interaction influence the probability of power transition conflicts between a dominant power and a competing power in the international system during power transition periods. The sample in this dissertation is comprised of power transition periods in the international system from 1860 to 1990. I employ unbalanced Time-Series Cross-Sectional (TSCS) data to capture the characteristics across countries over time. Concerning measures of domestic satisfaction and bilateral satisfaction, I utilize dictionary-based textual analysis to gather data from historical newspapers. In terms of the empirical approach, I apply a two-level model (national level and systemic level) that includes two nested sources of clustering in the unit- and time-dimensions. I employ Bayesian hierarchical models to capture intra-national and cross-national distinctions in the initiation of power transition conflicts over time. Based on a series of regressions, I perform and analyze empirical evidence related to my hypotheses. I will conclude this dissertation with some important implications for the potential power transition between China and the U.S.

Author

• Jingjing An, Claremont Graduate University